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Article 8

WHAT PRICE JUSTICE: THE CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE REVISITED
Edgar S. and Jean Camper Cahn*
In The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, we attempted to analyze
the failure of our society to provide any systematic form of redress for persons
whose lives were circumscribed by institutional unresponsiveness. Underlying
our exposition of the neighborhood law firm was the belief that we had provided a blueprint for an institution which would be responsive to the poor
because of the nature of the obligation of the lawyer to the client. But in relying
upon this relationship, we failed to consider that in theory all instrumentalities
of law are founded upon a principle of responsiveness -but nonetheless they
have not worked. And slowly, but surely, neighborhood law firms, while paradoxically shedding light in an effective manner on the problems of the poor
have already begun the long road to unresponsiveness. So we are forced in
this article to ask why? The answer is very simple. In our zeal, and out of
pride in our profession's commitment to the role of advocate for the poor, we
had forgotten to grapple fully with the age-old question: qui custodiet ipsos
custodes?
This piece then deals with neighborhood law firms-but only in a sense.
Because in the face of mounting evidence, the exhortation of the prophet:
"Justice, Justice Shall ye pursue" will not let us rest content with this, or any other
single innovation. We

-

all of us -

and particularly the legal profession

-

will have to go still further afield. And yet, not afield at all. For, in the words
of T. S. Eliot:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.z
I
As the latest issue of the Legal Aid Briefcase so quaintly puts it, "neighborhood law firms are here to stay -with or without OEO." At present, at least
*
The opinions expressed herein are the personal views of the authors and in no way
represent the position of the United States government or any agency thereof.
We dedicate this piece to our father, Dr. John E. T. Camper, whose life has been an
affirmation of his abiding -faith in the capacity of the people of the ghetto to make democracy
work. To our father, the late Edmund Cahn, we owe the term, the consumer perspectiveand the concept it embodies.
Jean Camper Cahn is a member of the Connecticut Bar and District of Columbia Bar; B.A.,
Swarthmore College, 1957; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1961; now in private practice in
Washington, D. C.
Edgar S. Cahn is a member of the Connecticut Bar; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1956;
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the Director, Office of Economic Opportunity.
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550 neighborhood law offices in 160 communities staffed by more than 700
attorneys are now either funded or actually operating.
The term, neighborhood law firm, does not refer to a homogeneous class.'
Nonetheless, certain characteristics have emerged which indicate a common
pattern. The typical neighborhood law firms today look very much like the
legal aid offices they were to improve upon with the exception that they are
decentralized and take cases heretofore not handled by anyone.'
The case load mounts steadily. Demand begins quickly to edge past the
point of conscientious performance-and neighborhood staff lawyers shortly
find themselves inundated with demands for service.
The client is almost invariably an individual already in some kind of difficulty. Assistance is typically after the fact.
Achievements by and large must be counted in tenns of individual clients
helped - and occasionally, new precedents established - but not in terms of
administrative or commercial practices demonstrably altered.
Little if any research is being carried on that could effect significant legal
change unconnected with specific cases.4
There is a pervasive absence of any relationship between legal service programs and the organization of citizen groups such as tenant councils, welfare
mothers' organizations, or consumer groups.
Paid staff attorneys provide virtually all of the service with relatively little
use for volunteer members of the bar or part-time lawyers with marginal incomes receiving some form of subsidization.'
Nonprofessionals are receiving very little training that would enable them
to carry out functions now performed unnecessarily by lawyers because few
offices have been established with a lead time for planning or a built-in training
and internship program.
To the extent that these characteristics are viewed as deficiencies, we can
2 There are many other variables which make the neighborhood law firm less than a
homogeneous entity. They include: relationship to marginal lawyers and ethnic bar; relationship to Legal Aid as a partner, competitor, or antagonist; use of nonprofessionals (read:
poor people serving in auxiliary roles); emphasis on civil versus criminal and/or juvenile
cases; emphasis on service function versus test case law reform or social change function;
extent of training provided for staff lawyers; use of volunteer lawyers, extent of preventive
law education and counseling; use of legal advice clinics; coordination with social services
and other community action antipoverty programs; subject-matter emphasis of cases taken;
areas of cases ruled out; rigidity of referral agreement on fee generating cases; indigency
standards; militancy, extent of accessibility, referral policies; representation of poor on board
or policy advisory committee.
Each of these variables render vulnerable any attempt to generalize on neighborhood law
firms. Thus, for instance, the newly financed Houston program provides for denominating one
lawyer as Ombudzman or grievance counsellor who reviews all instances where a person
is aggrieved with the legal services program-e.g., on questions of eligibility, and is authorized to take an appeal, review it from the aggrieved person's point of view and make the
final and binding decision.
3 Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-Poverty Program, 31 LAw & CONT MP.
PROB. 211, 231-249 (1966)
4 One reason for this is that there has been previously little effort to coordinate communication between attorneys so that there is an awareness of recurrences of particular
problems; and even in the few cases where communication occurs proposals have failed to
establish units within such systems devoted to law reform rather than to the handling of cases.
5 And optimal use is not made of this limited manpower supply. For example, motions
are matters which can be handled expeditiously by one attorney on a rotation system. There
is nothing in this that violates the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship or should be
offensive to the courts.
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expect the evolution of a series of ad hoc solutions: more dollars and more
staff; more extensive use of nonprofessionals; development of form books in
"poor law" areas; grievance mechanisms to review refusals to accept a particular client or a particular case; greater use of volunteer lawyers; better coordination with nonlegal services; experimentation and group representation; massive
enforcement of newly established precedents as a priority item; preventive law
programs; family legal checkups; utilization of marginal lawyers on a part-time
retainer basis as a means of expanding the available manpower supply and
of providing continued education. All of these are important and necessary
improvements. Some have already been undertaken or at least the need for
them has been acknowledged by some programs.
Notwithstanding the significant contribution that these neighborhood law
firms have begun to make and will continue to make, it is the authors' contention that the ends of justice will not be served if all that neighborhood law
firms do is foist on the poor a legal system which the middle class has rejected
as obsolete, cumbersome, and too expensive in money, psychological strain and
investment of time. This would be true, even if particular legal doctrines were
less biased against the poor.
It is our contention that the difficulties now being experienced by neighborhood law firms go to deficiencies in the nature of our legal system itself deficiencies experienced by the middle class as well as the poor.
To use an economic model,6 we, as a profession, merchandise a line of
products: rights, remedies, protection, entitlements are among the chief items
set forth in West's equivalents of mail order catalogs.
Law offices, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies are among the industrial plants which produce our line of merchandise.
And the product might be said to be manufactured through various
processes including the adversary process, the legislative, executive and administrative process. By and large, courts might be viewed as the "law industry's
form of quality control" - our underwriters label with respect to fairness,
constitutionality, and appropriateness of application.
The manpower for this industry includes legislators, bureaucrats, elected
officials. But, in a narrower sense, the manpower supply for the legal business
all carry LL.B. union cards.
This is in short the system for producing or manufacturing law in this
society. Neighborhood law firms are only a part of that system - a new method
of distribution of the product -a
new way of expanding retail outlets to meet
the needs of the market for justice under law.
But, if we avoid myopic preoccupation with the new retail outlets we have
6 This kind of model is one automatically repugnant to the professional who objects to
the implied taint of commercialism. See dissent in Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 1, 9 (1964). Yet, the priestly mantle of professionalism has been used and abused to
prevent accountability to the consumer and to hinder the development of any measures of

comparability or essentiality with respect to the worth of the service provided. We believe
that the true calling of the profession-the calling of justice-is best served by accountability
unbeclouded by mysticism and self-serving ritualism. It is furthermore our belief that this
same model is applicable to other professions. See the penetrating discussion of the medical
professionals' failing by Elinor Langer---"The Shame of American Medicine" in the Naw
YORK REVIEW oF Booxs, 6-12, May 26, 1966.
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devised, we must ask ourselves how good is the entire system -the
the production system, the manpower supply.
And, we would contend that
-

producer,

the product we are selling - quality legal services - is virtually unusable
for the purpose for which sold.
the production and distribution system we are currently attempting to
expand is basically obsolete.
And, the manpower supply is curtailed sharply by unnecessary, nonfunctional protectivist guild restrictions.

Let us

rm to a brief examination of each.

A. The Product
On the most general level, rules which offer guides to action are among
the chief products of the legal system.
But in practice this product offers remarkably little guide to action. This
is in part because of the complexity of the rules, in part because they are not
known or knowable to people who must use them without benefit of counsel,
in part because of the infinite refinements which experience engrafts on general
rules, and in part because each rule is the product of at least two or three contending and competing policy considerations which emerge only through specific
cases or the kind of hypotheticals found in the Restatement of Law.7
We have taken the fundamentally sound principle that like cases should
be decided alike - and perverted it into a license to proliferate distinctions,
to define and redefine what cases are alike and what cases are different.8
As a consequence, the consumer can neither read the catalog of rules nor
comprehend what rights and remedies are suitable or even available.
A second major product of the legal system is remedies. These remedies
purport to be adequate and effective, but they are not. They are available only
7 Grant Gilmore has analyzed the breakdown of the case law system-and suggested
that the excrescenses of that system have been curbed by the drafting of uniform codes.
Gilmore, Legal Realism, Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 '(1961). But uniform
codes cannot be said to be models of lucid prose and certainly are not intelligible to the
layman. And these codes, quickly become encrusted both with new interpretive decisions
and with speculations as to the extent to which they incorporate prior distinctions and lines
of precedent.
8 (MICHEL DE MONTArGNE, EssAs-"Of Experience," 292-3 (Classics Club ed. 1943)
"Therefore I do not much like the opinion of the man who thought by a multiplicity of
laws to bridle the authority of judges, cutting up their meat for them. He did not realize that
there is as much freedom and latitude in the interpretation of laws as in their creation.
"... For we have in France more laws than all the rest of the world together, and more
than would be needed to rule all the worlds of Epicurus: As formerly we suffered from
crimes, so now we suffer from laws [Tacitus]. And yet we have left so much room for opinion
and decision to our judges, that there never was such a powerful and licentious freedom. What
have our legislators gained by selecting a hundred thousand particular cases and actions, and
applying a hundred thousand laws to them? This number bears no proportion to the infinite
diversity of human actions. Multiplication of our imaginary cases will never equal the variety
of the real examples. Add to them a hundred times as many more: it still will not happen
that a single future event will find one, in all the many, many thousands of selected and
recorded events, that will fit and match it so exactly that some circumstance and difference
will not remain, which will require different consideration in judgment. There is little relation
between our actions, which are in perpetual transformation, and fixed and immutable laws.
The most desirable laws are those that are rarest, simplest, and most general; and I even
think ' that it would be better to have none at all than to have them in such numbers as we
have."
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on an all-or-nothing basis, require considerable effort, and risk to secure, are
not available speedily enough to do any good, and do not necessarily correspond
to the quantity or the quality of the harm they purport to redress. Moreover,
the cost of the remedy frequently exceeds its worth.
In short, by any test that "Consumer Reports" might impose, the products
merchandised by the legal system fit into the "Unacceptable" category. Those
tests might be said to include: simplicity and speed of operation, availability,
dependability, risk involved in use, uniformity of quality and satisfaction (both
actual and psychological).' The legal profession's products - "rights and
remedies" - do not by and large live up to the implied warranty of merchantability: useful for the purpose for which sold.
B. The Production System
Rules and remedies are produced by many processes: legislative, judicial,
executive, administrative.
Each of these systems requires scrutiny from two points of view:its present effectiveness in functioning (in doing what they hold themselves out as doing);
its ability to respond to new needs, and to initiate change.
In terms of present effectiveness, we shall concentrate, perhaps unfairly,
on the courts as the chief "symbolic" dispenser of rules and remedies.Y
We recognize that courts handle only a very small portion of legal problems- and moreover, that legislatures and administrative agencies dispense
more rules and make more "adjudications" than courts.
But courts, because they sit in judgment on issues of interpretation, constitutionality, and application or administration of rules, are in-effect the "quality
control" system of the entire legal process. The presence, absence or availability
of the judicial imprimatur of fairness, due process, equity, and legality shapes
the actions, or at least the outer limits of action, by other rule makers and remedy
dispensers.
Winston Churchill is said to have remarked that you cannot win at the
bargaining table what your troops could not have won in the field. The courts
trial, our own legitimated
are our society's legally constituted battlefields -the
form of combat.
As such, the courts tend to set the outer bounds of what one can win in
other rule-producing or remedy-dispensing arenas.
Both in their broadly normative role and their narrowest adjudicative one,
courts are not a particularly effective or efficient "justice producing" mechanism.
9 These defects present no great impediment to the sophisticated legal practitionerbut then the lawyer's counterpart in other fields (e.g., medicine, electronics, and automotive
engineering) is similarly equipped to deal with the defects and danger detected by Consumer
Reports.
10 We are here considering only how effective the system is-at any one moment in time.
In this context it is more appropriate to deal with entitlements and rules as "static" and fixed.

With respect to any particular action or injury, the existence of broad areas of discretion with
which courts do not tamper or of legislative freedom to change rules-does not make the
presence or absence of effective recourse to the courts less central. With respect to the second
issue-the legal system's ability to respond to new needs and to initiate change-courts admittedly play a far less central role.
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The jury has been described by Thurman Arnold as a body of twelve men
chosen to decide which side has the better lawyer.
In addition, juries appear equally to serve an "error producing function"
acting to correct the Draconian implications of a rule of law by creating
grounds for appeal so that the rule may be rescrutinized and hopefully made
more rational and compassionate in the process. But a system that depends
so heavily on the production of "error," delays and appeals is not necessarily
the most efficient. 1'
The system's method for obtaining the relevant facts is significantly hampered by evidentiary rules which, taken altogether, compose less than an ideal
epistemology. Jerome Frank, Robert Hutchins, and others have commented
on how poorly our fact finding system does in reconstructing the past - in
getting at the "truth" involved in a litigated case. Edmond Cahn has suggested
that those apparent disortions in our search for the past really serve the cause
of justice by inserting the equities and perspectives of the present into that
fictional reconstruction of the past. Maybe, he suggests, we do not really want
to find the past. We believe that analysis to be correct. But it then becomes
particularly odd that we should attempt to do justice by going through a ritual
we do not want to go through. The fact that justice can sometimes be done
despite the procedural apparatus established to do justice is not the strongest
possible recommendation for that apparatus. For the most part, litigation is
a way of viewing the past through the eyes of the present. But perhaps justice
is best done by starting with the present-with present needs and present demands - and using the past only where it reveals equitable considerations
which will provide guidance in shaping a remedy or significantly altering the
nature of the solution which on its face appears fairest. In other words, we do
or a future-oriented- method of dispute
not begin with a present-orientedsettlement.
We are still- in contract law, in domestic law, in landlord tenant law,
in tort law- engaged in a quest for fault, for "who did what when" as a
way of deciding how the risk should be borne and who should pay, perform
or provide remedy. Yet, in domestic relations, industrial injuries, automobile
accidents, we are finding that the quest for fault is time consuming, elusive and
not particularly productive in terms of enabling human beings to get back on
their feet and to cope with the present or chart a rational course for the future.' 2
There is a reason for this. Fault, ever since the Garden of Eden, has been
mankind's way of allocating limited resources on the basis of moral desert of finding justifications for making peace with the unsatisfactory.
Fault tends to operate as an all-or-nothing doctrine, as an invitation to
delay, and as a disincentive to mitigate injury.
11 Viewed psychologically, this error-producing function is our society's means of reinstituting ego control when either the id or the superego has gotten out of hand.
12
The righteous is not innocent of the deeds of the wicked, . . . You cannot separate
the just from the unjust, and the good from the wicked;
For they stand together, before the face of the sun, even as the black thread and
the white are woven together.
And when the black thread breaks, the weaver shall look into the whole cloth, and
he shall examine the loom also.
KAHLIL GmrBAN, THE PROPHET, 47-48 (1937).
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It is in essence the way men have dealt with limitations- of apportioning
resources when someone had to suffer and there was not enough to go around. 8
There is, we have found, an alternative to fault based on alleged moral desert
as a distributive and risk-sharing principle - namely, insurance. The principle
of insurance is based on the assumption that it is possible to define some classes
of injuries where there is enough to go around - that probability studies and
sharing of cost is a better way to distribute risk and is more consistent with our
increasingly complex and sophisticated appreciation of causation."
In short, there may be ways of asking "how can we make a person whole,"
how can we distribute risk, how can we create incentives to socially desirable
behavior and sanctions for undesirable behavior without antiscientific notions
of responsibility and without resort to distorted and fictional reconstruction of
the past?
But the present system for the production of rules and remedies -so
far
as the courts can be taken as illustrative and focal- does not permit of this
kind of inquiry. Thus, from the point of view of the individual aggrieved or the individual in need of guidance, the production system is woefully inadequate to give prompt satisfactory delivery.
The production system, however, must be judged by a second test - its
ability to respond to new needs, to initiate change, and to modify itself.
In assessing this capability, three separate issues arise:
how well equipped is the system to detect the need for changes
how disposed is the system to welcome change

and
how cumbersome are the mechanisms for effectuating the change.
With due respect to the admirable work of bar committees drafting commissions, etc., in recommending and securing needed reforms, the system is
significantly defective on all three counts.
Its own institutional structure and doctrines constitute-an epistemology
which declares what needs do and do not exist. The capacity of the system,
therefore, to take judicial notice of changing circumstances is circumscribed
because the legal system defines the universe of legal need. Thus doctrines of
13 We can see, running throughout the statute books of the nineteenth century, . . . attempts to affirm the notion of man's moral responsibility for his economic well-being, even as
action inconsistent with that proposition was taken. Exception after exception has been piled
onto the proposition that [every able-bodied] man is morally responsible for his economic wellbeing. And ultimately that proposition was to be virtually transformed by society's coming to
equate the notion of "able-bodied" with one who is well-fed, decently clothed, medically attended, emotionally adjusted, adequately trained or educated, and provided with ample job
opportunities as well as being physically strong.
From a twentieth-century vantage point, these "exceptions" served two functions. First,
these humanitarian reforms provided a rational scheme for gradually contracting the available
labor supply at a time when technological unemployment made a contraction mandatory. And
second, these exceptions expanded the class of the "deserving" poor - those whose plight
resulted from circumstances which society acknowledged to be beyond their control - thereby
progressively redefining the groups who were to share in the augmented wealth of the nation
at a pace consonant with the changes in reality. In short, such humanitarian exceptions rationalized both the decreasing demand for human labor and the increasing need for consumers of
the new industrial wealth. (C. Woodard, Reality and Social Reform 72 Yale Law Journal 286,
311 (1962))
14 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 NE 99 (1928) (Dissenting opinion).
The couplet "In Adam's Fall We Sinned All" at least dispenses with the need to look
further for "proximate cause."
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privilege and largesse deny the legitimacy of new kinds of entitlement; doctrines
of administrative discretion prevail over demands for disclosure and accountability; the doctrines of clean hands nullify all claims for remedy by defining the
claimant as belonging to the great unwashed; doctrines of contractual consent
and bona fide purchaser for value effectively proscribe certain forms of empirical
inquiry regarding actual knowledge, commercial practices, parity of bargaining
power, and sophistication.
On the second count, the system's willingness to welcome change is compromised by the fact that the system itself is the product on the one hand of
a resolution of conflicting interests and policy considerations (each of which
has behind it the momentum of inertia) and on the other hand, by the fact
that the system is manned by men who have the greatest interest in preserving
it unchanged, who prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar, defeat to uncertainty, and their own primacy and indispensability to any decline in status that
might accompany change.
With respect to the third and final issue- complexity of the mechanism
for effecting change-it is safe to say that the politics of the legal profession
are at least as complex and sophisticated as those of the overall political process,
that lawyers are less fooled by rhetoric, more keenly alert to implications and
ambiguities, more tenacious and pugnacious than probably any other groupand that the "retooling" processes of social change within the legal system require the manipulation and creation of consensus among the most disputatious
breed of dissenters on the face of the earth.
In consequence, events outstrip reform, need outstrips increments in resources, practices do not keep abreast of rules, the structure of institutions does
not accurately reflect actual decision-making processes and the patterns of official
conduct are most resistant to change or reform by the "production system."
In short, both because of the nature of the adversary system in response to
particular needs and the resistance of the legal system to change, Justice
1967 style is not likely to be substantially different from the 1867 model described
in the following passage in Dickens' Bleak House:
This is the Court of Chancery... which gives to monied might the means
abundantly of wearing out the right, which so exhausts finances, patience,
courage, hope; so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that there
is not an honorable man among its practitioners who would not give the warning, "Suffer any wrong that can be done you, rather than come
here."
C. The Manpower Supply
Finally, with respect to manpower, we have created an artificial shortage
by refusing to learn from the medical and other professions and to develop
technicians, nonprofessionals and lawyer-aides - manpower roles to carry out
such functions as: informal advocate, technician, counsellor, sympathetic listener,
investigator, researcher, form writer, etc.
At present, lawyers are expected to perform all these functions. To so
equip them, lawyers are put through an extensive period of formal training and
then apprenticeship that limits the number that can be produced. Yet, lawyers
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spend only a small portion of their time performing functions which cannot be
performed equally well by less thoroughly trained persons. Nonetheless, the
profession has refused tenaciously to delegate any of these functions to anyone
else.
This manpower shortage has been reinforced and intensified by policies
which purport to have the sole end of protecting the client from unskilled or
unethical practitioners.
Thus, for instance, we have adopted a licensing system to certify who may
hold themselves out to render legal services in a given jurisdiction. Licensing
persons to perform certain acts is certainly one plausible way to protect the
client or consumer. But our licensing procedures take no account of the varieties
5
and gradations of skill which would be adequate from the consumer's view.
Rather than attempting to relax the shortages caused by licensing, the
profession has developed in such a way as to increase those tendencies."x
First, the old practice of "reading the law" has fallen by the wayside. On
the other hand, a licensing approach looses a novice on the public (and especially
on the poor) with virtually no concern as to whether three additional years of
academia have equipped the starting lawyer to protect the innocent consumer
of his services. Second, we have made no distinction as they have in England
between tasks performed by a solicitor and a barrister. Third, two of our canons
of ethics - the prohibition on the use of lay intermediaries and the prohibi15 "Woe unto you, lawyers! For ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not
in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered" "(Liike XI, 52).
16 During'at least one era in our country's history-- that bf Jacksonian democracy there was a revolt against the profession's restrictive entry requirements which made the law
the exclusive preserve of the privileged. This period is 'generally lamented as causing a deterioration in the profession's standards. From the point of view, of human dignity and democracy, the profession's loss may well have been the nation's gain - 'but some commentators
have perceptively pointed out that democratizing the profession did not entail a disregard, or
lack of appreciation for the values of excellence:
"The doors of the legal profession were certainly thrown open to representatives of every
economic group. As certainly, inadequately trained members of any class were not prevented
from entering it. Yet it should not be hastily assumed that acquiescence in this state of affairs
denoted a general and rather incomprehensible failure to appreciate that a democracy, equally
with other forms of government needs well-trained lawyers to attend to its affairs. It denoted
rather a lack of faith in the efficacy of governmental action, or even of formal preparatory
training, to produce this result. Reliance was placed upon experience as a teacher, and upon
the free play of competition as a means of winnowing the good lawyers from the bad. At best,
before a young man has actually begun to practise, little can be done toward making a real
lawyer out of him, and scanty data are available for determining whether or not he will eventually succeed. It could be argued plausibly, therefore, that natural aptitude, after all, is the
main factor in the making of an accomplished practitioner, and that better results will be
secured by bringing a beginner face to face with genuine responsibilities soon, than by insistmug upon a long probationary period under artificial conditions."
REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 7

(1928).

See Also: Elbridge Gale of Michigan writing in 1850:
"Any man may give either medicine or gospel and collect his dues... I want the lawyers
to stand upon the same platform with the priests and the doctors. A man's property is no better
than his life or his soul. We allow a man to tamper with both soul and body, but not with
property."
Quoted

in REED,

TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW 89

(1928).

A resolu-

tion adopted by the Washington Conference on Legal Education in 1922 advances a supplemental argument:
"Since the legal profession has to do with the administration of the law, and since public
officials are chosen from its ranks more frequently than from the ranks of any other professions
or business, it is essential that the legal profession should not become the monopoly of any
economic class." 47 REp. Ai. BAR ASSN. (1922), 483 quoted in REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 6 (1928).
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tion on unauthorized practice of law by laymen -have operated to extend the
licensing system beyond any functional justification at all.
The Brotherhood case may well have gutted, at least in theory, the restrictivist "lay intermediaries" canon. As the Court noted:
We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of
the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their
plan for advising workers who1 are
injured to obtain legal advice and for
7
recommending specific lawyers.
But in practice that canon still holds sway. Similarly, the "unauthorized
practice of law" canon is invoked to hamper efforts to disseminate legal knowledge and assistance more widely. This canon tends to be construed loosely as
a prohibition against anyone but a lawyer giving legal advice.
That may be a convenient way to protect a monopoly on legal advice. It
is not the way to see that the rule of law is implanted firmly and broadly throughout a society.
A less restrictive, analytic approach would suggest that the canon is only
an attempt to define who may perform what functions in what forums. This
canon is simply a statement that with respect to the judicial forum only lawyers
are competent to play certain specified roles. Thus, a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. In effect, the judicial system defines who may
practice in courts and who may not. In the context of formal litigation, and
steps leading directly to formal litigation, this kind of licensing by the courts
makes sense. It operates to protect the clients by indicating who knows the
ground rules of the judicial forum. Similarly, other forums set their own specifications regarding who may appear in what capacity. There is no reason to
take a canon of ethic developed for use in one forum and to insist that it applies
to all forums or to any place where any legal subject is discussed."
D. Summary of Consequences
We have, then, an inefficient system for dispensing an unsatisfactory product
which is kept in unnecessarily short supply by a monopoly-created scarcity of
manpower.
The result is a kind of inflation - still operating to keep justice out of the
reach of the consumer. And we, the producer, in pushing for an expansion of
traditional legal services, are thus engaged in a sales pitch for a product that
we can't offer within the price of the market it must reach to do any good.
Because of this inflation caused by artificially induced shortage, only the
most grievous injuries or dangers -such
as the stigma of a criminal prosecution or, in civil matters, a claim with high monetary value or subjectively valued
psychological stakes as perceived by the parties - will make it worthwhile trying
to get justice through legal services at the going market price. Llewelyn illustrates the inflation caused by the nature of the product, the process and the
manpower in his description of the worth of a right to obtain damages for
17 377 U.S. 1, 8.
18 Thus, under some circumstances in juvenile court, in hearings on revocation of parole,
in arbitration proceedings, nonlawyers are permitted and expected to act as advocates. The
rule wisely varies as to "who may do what in what forum" because each forum has its own
procedural rules, its own clientele and its own set of "practitioners."
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breach of contract in A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 Colum.
L. Rev. 431, 437 (1930):
That right could rather more accurately be phrased somewhat as follows:
if the other party does not perform as agreed, you can sue, and if you have
a fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong with your witnesses or the jury,
and you give up four or five days of time and some ten to thirty percent
of the proceeds, and wait two to twenty months, you will probably get a
judgment for a sum considerably less than what the performance would
if the other party is solvent, and has not
have been worth -which,
secreted his assets, you can, in further due course, collect with six percent
interest for delay.
This is an exorbitant price for the wealthy. For the poor, where petty sums
are involved, it is a travesty. It takes considerable resources to invoke the litigation process. It takes a severe wrong to make it worth expending those
resources to obtain vindication -even if one has the resources. And the cost
to a poor person goes far beyond what it does to the wealthy. He can afford
the law's delay less. And he stands to gain far less.
For the poor, it would be better to sell shares in their cause of action, to
discount justice, so to speak." But our canons of ethics prohibit that. Only
the rich can afford to invest in justice's dividends. With today's overcrowded
court calendars, it is, even for them, definitely a long-term investment - and
not necessarily a profitable one.
New legal service programs for the poor cannot then rest with providing
the poor with greater opportunity to use a legal system which the middle class
too expensive in monetary, psyhas found to be obsolete, cumbersome -and
chological and temporal terms."0
Both for the poor and the nonpoor Justice is in short supply. The result
is inflation and inflation for the poor does not mean doing without justice. It
means Injustice.
The middle class has found a way of dealing with this inflation. They do
not buy legal services - except as a last resort.
Instead, they have used the legal profession to develop a set of substitutes
a legal system which operates without benefit of LL.B. wherever possible.
more than Saranwrap is
This system is not the same as legal services -any
wax paper. But it works as well- maybe better.
In essence, the lawyer acts as the architect of institutions (such as corporations) and as the draftsman of instruments that can be utilized effectively
by laymen without continual surveillance and intervention by lawyers.
Thus, in the tort field, insurance companies and claims adjusters do much
of the work of lawyers.
In the real property field, title insurance companies and realtors using form
leases, conveyances, etc., provide a substitute for the profession's traditional staple.
19 In effect, this is precisely what the poor do in settling claims and signing waivers in
plea-bargaining and in reaching "an accord and satisfaction." But the terms are less than
advantageous.

20 Nor can such programs function simply to endow the poor with the ultimate recourse
of the middle class-litigation--because the middle class has found recourse to courts to be
unsatisfactory either as a final or an intermediary remedy.
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In domestic relations, informal agreements worked out between the parties
or through intermediaries often take the place of court-approved arrangements.
And particularly in the divorce field, we find a kind of foreign competitionthe Mexican or Reno equivalent of the Japanese camera- thriving on the
obsolescence of "domestic" law.
In the estates field, banks, making heavy use of the intervivos trust, stationery stores selling will forms and now laymen using Dacen's (a nonlawyer) bestselling book How to Avoid Probate, have taken over much of the probate
business.
In the field of commercial law, arbitration has supplanted much judicial
resolution of conflict.
In contract law, contracting offices, run by laymen using boiler plate
lawyer-drawn agreements probably negotiate the bulk of contractual agreements.
And those are enforced without resort to lawyers or courts so far as possible.
In the criminal law, low visibility decisions of an 'essentially consensual
sort have largely replaced formal prosecution. The whole range of plea-bargaining practices provide an alternative to submitting to the stigma of criminal
prosecution and the retributive mentality it still exemplifies. Thus, for instance,
the policeman does not make a formal arrest of a middle-class youth. The quid
pro quo is that the father agrees that this behavior is a matter for parental
concern and attention.
All of these are, technically speaking, part of the legal system. In essence,
they constitute a network of privately negotiated consensual agreements. They
enable the middle class to minimize its contact with the legal profession largely
because the parties involved have a rough parity of bargaining power -and
because, as a last resort, either party usually can threaten to hire a lawyer and
utilize all the law's subtlety, delay, refinement, insensitivity and winner-take-all
principle to vitiate the worth of victory for either side. Ironically, the poor
have been dragged into this system and forced to participate without any parity
of bargaining power - and without even the ultimate threat of the middle class:
to hire a lawyer and thus compel the supplanting of both parties with professional combatants.
Just as the day of the hired gunman passed when the homesteaders learned
to hire their own mercenaries, so too the rule of law may be about to pass into
a new phase once the poor are provided with access to neighborhood law offices.
With gunmen on both sides, the irrationality of this mode of conflict resolution
may begin to dawn on our society. But if legal services programs for the poor
are to make a contribution beyond their own extinction to the emergence of a
new system of law for the poor, they must begin to respond to the underlying
deficiencies in the legal system with which the middle class has begun to cope,
and which private enterprise has long been able to circumvent with considerable
success.
Thus the poor will need their own realtors, their own insurance companies,
their own corporate structures, their own arbitration associations, their own
administrative tribunals, their own means for entering into private consensual
arrangements that reflect their needs and desires with fidelity.
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We have little faith that simply providing the poor with lawyers and more
lawyers will achieve this end -largely because the legal system is characterized
by a variety of shortage producing devices. Greater use will lead to greater
refinement and the development of more shortage producing mechanisms to
cope with inevitable scarcity. Saturation litigation and skillful advocacy may
bring relief to a few, but the legal profession does not have the resources to
enable it to bring justice to all under the present production system.
Two ilustrations may suffice.
Recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the right of the accused to
counsel from the earliest stages of a criminal proceeding threaten to engross a
tenth or more of the energies of the entire legal profession for the foreseeable
future. Manpower projections based upon the number of crimes committed
and the amount of lawyer's time required conscientiously to handle each case
under the prevailing system indicate that the present number of full-time paid
public defenders will have to be increased over 40 times to provide the representation constitutionally mandatory for all those accused of a crime. Money
alone is hardly a remedy for this deficiency - though the cost involved is estimated to run over $200 million a year for the federal government.
Second, the welfare regulations operative in Los Angeles at the time of
the Watts riots weighed over 115 pounds and stacked vertically made a pile
over five feet high.21
Similarly, the New York City welfare allowance is budgeted on a minutely
prescribed basis: 90 razor blades per year for an employed male; 50 for an

unemployed male.22
There are no manpower projections on what it would take to insure that
each regulation in the 115-pound, five-foot stack is observed with nicety and
exactness. But a system which haggles over razor blades is likely to lose sight
of justice. The legal profession seems to be mesmerized by the number of
causes of action lurking in each regulation - and the whole program of legal
21 Selby, Watts: Where Welfare Bred Violence, THE READER'S DIGEST, 67, 69 (May,
1966).
22- Other rations include: 12 bars of soap, one deodorant, one box of tissues, 2 cans of
dentifrice a year, 1 lipstick a year. A nail file for a welfare client is budgeted to last four
years, a comb for two years. Annual dry-cleaning allowance covers one winter coat, one
spring coat, one dress and one skirt for the entire year. Yet we insist that the poor be clean,
well scrubbed, neatly dressed and appropriately groomed. Weingarten, Violet: Life at the
Bottom-Citizens' Committee for Children of New York-p. ii (1966).
This unilateral approach of budgeting might well be compared to the learning experience
derived under one experiment where teachers were given freedom to make their own decisions
with regard to the funds for equipment budgeted to them:
"One eastern school superintendent recently obtained a grant of about $10,000 to enable
an experiment in one of his elementary schools. Teachers were to develop specific educational
goals, be given the sum of money, and have complete freedom to buy whatever they wanted to
achieve their goals.
The teachers decided to emphasize "real-life" learning tasks in place of conventional class
tasks that children often regard as the artificial work of school.
Then preparation of the shopping list began. The teachers quickly learned that, sizeable
as their grant was, they could not go out on an indiscriminate shopping spree. Thus, it was
necessary for them to examine closely the learning value of each item of equipment. By the
time they scaled down the list and were ready to buy, their picture of a new learning program
was sharply focused in their minds. Also, because they had to reject so many useful items, the
teachers were more determined than ever to extract the most value out of those they could
acquire. Education: An Answer to Poverty, jointly published by the US Office of Education
and the Office of Economic Opportunity 43 (1965).
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services for the poor is threatened by a form of professional narcissistic entrapment.
We appear to define what is relevant in terms of how we can show off our

skills with the greatest virtuosity.2"
If Justice under law is to become a product for mass consumption, rather
than a luxury item for the privileged and for private enterprise, we will not
bring the price down within general reach by a straight exponential increase
in the present supply of legal services as currently rendered the poor - or even
the middle class. More neighborhood law firms, "judicare" programs, sliding
scales of indigency, expansion of law school enrollment, increase of legal technicians, a massive increase in federal expenditures - none of these will produce
more than the appearance of due process where the endless proliferation of rules
and safeguards masks our underlying misgivings above the humanity and fairness
of the system itself.24
The remainder of this article sketches out two approaches to the problem
of inflation - approaches which assume that a straight linear expansion of
existing neighborhood law offices is both desirable and necessarily inadequate.
One approach involves simply an expansion of supply - an expansion
which will, of necessity, involve an alteration in the nature of the product, the
nature of the production system, and the nature of the manpower supply. This
approach is discussed in the last part of the article in terms of specific proposals.
But these proposals, we insist, must be judged not only on their ability to alleviate
shortages, but equally, and more importantly, on their capacity to enable a
society to live with shortages equitably and democratically, to allocate available
resources in a manner that at once reflects the society's present priorities and
values, but which does not stand in the way of further evolution, further
change and further redefinition of the product: justice under law by each succeeding generation.
The other approach we term the demand-stimulating approach.
II.
The Demand Approach
On its face, an approach which calls for the stimulation of demand ap23

Then a lawyer said: But, what of our Laws, Master?
And he answered:
You delight in laying down laws,
Yet you delight more in breaking them.
Like children playing by the ocean who build sand-towers with constancy and then destroy them with laughter.
But what of those to whom life is not an ocean, and man-made laws are not sand-towers
But to whom life is a rock, and the law is a chisel with which they would carve it in
their own likeness?

What man's law shall bind you if you break your yoke but upon no man's prison door?
What laws shall you fear if you dance but stumble against no man's iron chains?
And who is he that shall bring you to judgment if you tear off your garment yet leave
it in no man's path?
KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET, 51-53 '(1937).
24 Thus in the criminal law, our procedural niceties only blunt a growing conviction that
something is wrong with the implications of assigning criminal responsibility for an out. In
welfare, interminable regulations on eligibility are attempts to obfuscate our doubts about
distinctions between the deserving and the undeserving poor and our growing insecurity about
the viability of the work ethic in its present form.
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pears inflationary. Increasing the effective demand for justice under law
would seem to intensify the shortage and act as a further inflationary pressure.
We believe an increase in demand to be anti-inflationary, both in the long
and short run. The demand, we insist, is not for legal services, but for redress
through the legal system. Legal services are simply a "brand-name created
monopoly" which tends to eclipse other forms of redress - until the demand
reaches a threshold which makes a quest for other forms of redress mandatory.
Thus, in the civil rights movement, impatience with litigation led to sit-ins as
a form of redress -leading to new legal doctrines, new kinds of plaintiffs, new
notions of test cases and new legislative reforms. In effect, the function of
advocacy, the task of enumerating demands and framing a prayer for relief
had been taken out of the hands of the legal profession and out of the courts.
Yet at present the demand for justice under law is treated as coextensive
with the demand for legal services. Other demands - for full citizenship, for
opportunity, for participation - are treated by the legal profession as "political
demands." In consequence, the demand for legal services reflects only imperfect-

ly the needs, priorities and grievances felt by the poor. Judicially cognizable
causes of action bear little resemblance to the most deep-seated concerns of the
poor for genuine equality, for excellence, for dignity, for genuine choice, and
even for sustenance itself. 5
The distance between the two - legal complaints and deeply felt grievances
-provides
a rough measure of the "demand gap," of the irrelevancy of legal
services, and of the unactivated and indeed, repressed demand which this approach desires to energize.
It is our belief that the intensification of demand can cause a rejection of
the old product, inducing people to turn to substitutes, and revealing a hitherto
25 Why, it may be asked, should the legal system be made to bear the freight of the entire
political and economic structure?
In part, because it sets the terms and conditions for use of that system. In part because it
mirrors the defects of that system. In part because it is a prime agent for the perpetuation and
entrenchment of that system. In part because it blocks the need for social awareness and social
reassessment by converting each need into a highly individual, personal, circumstantial case rather than facilitating the process by which a society recognizes a need, acknowledges its moral
validity - and copes with it accordingly. In effect, the legal system exercises a monopoly on
what constitutes a grievance (and by implication, what constitutes a grievance which may be
ignored with impunity). And even when the demands are legitimate, the legal system tends to
impose a clean hands doctrine which in effect denies to all but the "deserving poor" the right
to complain, to need, to feel or to demand.
So long as this monopoly continues, so long as it is free to define for itself to what demands
it must listen, and on what terms, and what remedies are appropriate, then the bulk of grievances and needs will never receive a full or fair hearing - or rational and full exposition.
There are other reasons why the legal system should begin to reflect need and priority more
accurately.
First, the process of seeking a redress for grievances, of assessing priorities, of converting
general discontent into a specific agenda of demands is itself a form of coping and of personal
fulfillment. Bitching is good therapy-but it is more where the grievance reflects a greater
pathology in the society than in the aggrieved.
Second, the amplification of demands is a powerful ally of rationality. The known and the
stated are better than the unknown and the unspeakable. Demands, even when they have not
been framed rationally - are sources of empirical knowledge which our society can ill afford
to ignore.
Fear cannot help but feed on a sense of inadequacy of inability to cope. The refusal to
confront the facts and to seek out the issues, to know the dimensions of the problems leaves the
mind prey to the fantasies of guilt, ignorance and insecurity. Stern repression is the way in
which the superego copes with the id. It proved rather ineffectual in Watts.
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unsuspected cross-elasticity in demand for the particular form of redress in which
the legal profession currently specializes. As Madison Avenue tells us, an increase
of demand can create incentive both for expansion and innovation.

It can

manifest the presence of a mass market and thus can act to usher in an entirely
new product, a new production system and a new manpower supply.
The essence of the first approach then is an intensification of the demand
for redress, for entitlement, for social justice, for opportunity and dignity.
The following discussion deals with both procedure and substance -with
the mechanism by which demands can be increased - and the substance of

those demands which are likely to have the greatest "multiplier effect."
If we look to the new demands levied on the legal process by such varied
developments as the Escobedo case and its progeny, the neighborhood law firm,
the use of nonprofessionals, the poverty program, the sit-ins, Brown v. Board
of Education, we can discern several mechanisms at work for stimulating demands for effective redress through the legal system.
1. The assertion of nominally conferred rights and entitlements can provide
a massive source of new demand upon a system based on nonassertion and
desuetude. Unasserted rights are consumer power removed from circulation.
Those "forced savings" can be spent - or at least invested to bring a return.
2. The legitimation of heretofore unacknowledged grievances can give rise
to new entitlements. In effect, this amounts to an increase in the consumer
power possessed by the aggrieved. (Prompted either by largesse or duress) the
sovereign, in effect, distributes a newly minted injustice as coin of the realm.
3. The raising of expectations - however vague and unfulfillable - generates
an awareness of grievances as grievances, needs as needs, injuries as injuries.
This in turn gives rise to entire new classes of entitlements possessed by persons
previously deemed outside the marketplace for justice altogether. In effect,
expectation makes consumers out of supplicants and defines new potential
markets where before there had been only gleaners existing on sufferance.
4. The introduction of a new product - such as decentralized legal services,
nonprofessionals- in effect stimulates demand by offering something now perceived as highly desirable.
5. Lowering the price also stimulates demand, if we recognize that the price
paid to exercise a right includes: sophistication, perseverance, courage, articulateness, staying power and middle-class style. Entitlement alone purchases very
little.
6. Advertising, publicity, public statements, operate to decrease the perceived
price of the product. They constitute a declaration to the market that the
product is or should be available. This in turn begins to generate a demand,
or an awareness, which can be projected and converted into a new form of
demand.2" More important, advertising can make people shift their buying
26 In Pittsburgh, a large poster has been tacked up on billboards. One part of that poster
starts in big boldface letters with the words"COOL THAT CONSTABLE"

It goes on:

"Know your rights. If the constable comes to seal your goods for non-payment of rent,
you're entitled to first choice of $300 worth of your furnishings - $600 for husband and wife.
And, in addition, you get to keep clothes, books, records and certain other personal items."
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priorities -so
that given a certain amount of emotional and physical effort
required, it may be expended on securing justice and redress through law (rather
than, for instance, in gang fights, crime, or hatred).
The net result of all these mechanisms is vastly to increase the number of
consumers with currency that the system is committed to honor as legal tender.
The process of turning grievances into legally redressable wrongs constitutes, in
its own way, the provision of a guaranteed minimum income for the consumers
of justice.
Yet, such gains can readily be offset, as the beneficiaries of Social Security
have found. The currency can be devalued overtly - or, more likely, the
product can be cheapened so that it is found to be relatively worthless. A slow
inflationary process may set in to prevent any further increase in real purchasing
power and to vitiate, at least partially, the initial gains made.
Continued increases in demand can offset such pressures. But, on the
other hand, they can produce an inflationary spiral which leaves the poor either
relatively or absolutely worse off than before. The question then becomes not
simply how to initiate demands- but also, how to prevent inflationary consequences from vitiating gains - and even from being distributed so regressively
as to result in still greater inequities.
Much will depend upon the mode of response to the demand for justice
under law. But the mode of response can be governed, at least in part, by the
nature of the demand.
Certain kinds of demands, we believe, are likely to be more inflationary
in impact than others. Thus, for instance, certain demands can be more readily
evaded with token response or offset by compensating reprisals and privations.
Other demands will be inflationary, not because they produce so inconsequential a response but because they do not significantly prompt an expansion of
available supply or generate the kind of pressures likely to yield a major breakthrough in the technology of justice.
The naked demand for a share (of lawyer's time, of the resources of our
legal system, of the rights and remedies nominally available) is, we believe,
the most vulnerable to depreciation. Such demands appear to threaten a, direct
redistribution of wealth, putting a premium on tokenism of' response. And they
create little inducement to expand supply significantly.
To prevent all gains from being rendered nugatory, the demand for a
share must include a qualitative as well as a quantitative component.- Thus,
the demand for representation by counsel quickly shifts to a demand for effective representation -just as the demand for integration (viewed as a quantitative demand for entry into a fundamentally mediocre educational system) has
shifted to a demand for excellence in schooling. Similarly, the demand for jobs
has begun to include a refusal to accept dead-end, menial positions.
In the legal services field, the demand for quality has tended falsely to
become a debate over volunteer versus full-time staff - and between the relative desirability of neighborhood law firms as against so-called judicare programs
"Don't sign a lease before seeing a lawyer. Most leases strip the tenant of the $300 exemption. Get written receipts for every pay-off to constable or landlord."
That poster was paid for and put up by the Mayor's commission.
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which in effect provide the poor with credit cards to go to the lawyers of their
choice. The equation of excellence with full-time staff and with neighborhood
law firms has not been empirically established - and it tends to be a self-serving
assertion -both on the part of staff lawyers who want more money and private practitioners who do not want the burden of charity cases. Yet, if legal
service programs are to do more than siphon money into the pockets of the
profession, the demand for legal services will have to take cognizance of the
special needs of the poor for high technical proficiency, inventiveness in creating
new legal doctrines, and special zealousness of advocacy. Otherwise, the poor
will find legal services as inadequate - and unavailable - as they have found
medical services where both the private practitioner and the clinic have been
unwilling to give charity patients extensive diagnostic work, expensive drugs,
referral to top-notch specialists or prolonged rehabilitative treatment and follow
up. We reject the assumption that quality cannot be attained by either arrangement or by creative mixtures of different approaches.
But we do contend that a demand - even for a share of goods and services
-must
be coupled with a demand for quality, for excellence, if it is to have
the maximum resistance to depreciation and the maximum anti-inflationary
impact on the price of justice - both immediately and over time. This appears
probable for three reasons.
First, a demand for excellence creates incentive to upgrade existing services.
Second, a demand for excellence creates incentive to quest for new forms
of excellence other than those based upon the scarcity-producing mechanisms of
the present legal system.
Third, it inhibits our ability simply to go through the motions of doing
justice. The present system encourages us to believe that shortage is inevitable
and that our own welfare is dependent upon the privation of others. Justice
can tolerate no two-class system. Our own humanity cannot resist the corrosion
that results from dehumanizing others. The demand for excellence enlists not
our selfish instinct for survival but rather, our greater impulse for salvation.
However, the demand for a share- both quantitative and qualitative must be coupled with a demand for a voice in determining the nature and the
adequacy of the response. Quantity and quality are a matter of judgment and that judgment should rest in significant part and perhaps ultimately, with
the consumer. This would be so even if there were no cause for concern that
a legal aid agency's representations about its own performance were biased.
The quality of justice itself is altered by whether its content is unilaterally or
mutually determined.
And the demand for a voice has direct anti-inflationary potential. It prevents unilateral devaluation of a right or a grievance by the landlord, merchant,
welfare official or policeman. But it also operates to check irresponsible, unilateral escalation of demand by the consumer. Divestiture of responsibility for
shaping or approving the response operates to exonerate one from responsibility
for tempering yearning with judgment and need with a sense of priority. Newly
established civilian review boards for complaints against police will afford opportunity to assess the potential effect of the demand for a voice both in preventing
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unchecked flouting of the law by officials and in promoting responsibility of
criticism by the citizenry.
If the demand approach is to have a deflationary impact, then a "cost of
justice" index must begin to show an increase in the consumer's "real purchasing
power." The consumer needs not only an increase in the paper currency of
entitlements. He needs direct protection to prevent devaluation. The demand
for a share coupled with a voice at least provides the protection of surveillance.
But the anti-inflationary potential of demand can be augmented further by a
third component - a demand to contribute directly to the production of justice,
fair play and remedy for the injured.
Thus, we add to the demand for a share, and a voice, a third elementthe demand for a role, an opportunity to contribute, to participate in the
expansion of supply. The high price of justice is due to scarcity. The demand
to participate, to contribute, to labor, is a demand to help directly in expanding
the supply. It also entails a radical alteration in a highly overprofessionalized,
unnecessarily complex and cumbersome system. The insistent request to assist
in the retooling of our legal system, to contribute time and labor and knowledge,
is likely to serve as an inducement to innovation. So long as innovation must
be devised on the assumption of a fixed and limited supply of manpower, knowledge, expertise and endeavor, it is likely to result chiefly in minor refinements
and continuous upgrading of the same basic product and piecemeal reform.
The demand to incorporate new sources of manpower, and new kinds of insight
and expertise as an integral part of the legal system is likely to stimulate innovation and hasten the demise of our present, handcrafted guild system."'
Furthermore, the demand for justice, coupled with a demand to assist in
its full realization is difficult to denigrate in a society so committed to the work
ethic. The corollary of this is that redress through the legal system is likely to
be the more valued if it comes not as a new dole, grudgingly bestowed, but
rather as the product of an enterprise in which the consumer is also engaged
as a producer.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that the first project proposed by the
poor in one community was a "sanitary corps" which would give the poor
partial responsibility not just for cleaning up, but also for code inspection and
code enforcement. Similarly, in city after city, the reclamation of "vest pocket
parks" from trash heaps and abandoned lots bespeaks the significance of con-:
tribution, of a personal role in the creation of a habitable neighborhood as
well as a voice on the local planning board or a larger share of recreational
facilities.
One further factor requires special mention

-

the degree of specificity.

The mechanisms to stimulate demand can be set in motion and the demand
can include provision for a share, a voice and a role. Yet, the entire effort can
be rendered nugatory by either too great or too little specificity.
27 Cause and effect here are inextricably linked. It is, for instance, difficult to tell whether
the large numbers of dispossessed able-bodied men and women made available by the enclosure
movement in England accelerated the Industrial revolution and produced technological

changes, or whether new industrial innovations hastened the displacement of cottage industry
and helped to bring about the enclosure movement. But the evidence of interaction and mutual
reinforcement is clear.
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A demand which contains no specificity, no priorities, no agenda, no tentative enumeration provides no guidance and suggests no acceptable minimum.
In one sense, this is what a riot is - a cry without a bill of particulars. And
such a cry can result in sufficient confusion, sufficient action at cross purposes
that even with more resources and the most intense concern, the benefits derived
prove largely illusory. Lack of content, amorphousness of expression invites
power struggles to capitalize on the notoriety and the resources that disorder
yields. But this unchecked cupidity invites disillusionment, cynicism and ultimately indifference. The demand approach imposes a duty to attempt tentative articulation.
But this duty should not be converted into a requirement of total specificity
-for
that can be equally destructive.
Excessive specificity operates to limit the responsibility of professionals
and officials for exploring and responding to the needs which underlie and
prompted the original demand. The reply, "You got what you asked for" is
the danger inherent in enumeration. Moreover, a requirement of specificity is
likely to be used by the society at large, not only to limit its own moral responsibility but to impose upon the poor, the uneducated, the needy and the aggrieved,
the total burden of diagnosing their own situation and framing their own demands (in such a way, of course, that the diagnosis reflects no blame on the
society at large).
Thus, overspecificity appears to impose on the responder a purely ministerial function - absolving him from the necessity of initiating a more farreaching, and creative quest for a solution.
If the demand approach is to be successful, it must challenge a society to
do its utmost, to devise new solutions, to assign its best talents to the improvement of the human condition.
This is the form of competition over time that Schumpeter called the
process of creative destruction. It is not the same as that competition initiated
by the launching of Sputnik. But it will require at least as substantial a reallocation of resources. For in the quest for justice, man is racing against himself toward an age-old aspiration that lies beyond the stars.
III.
The Supply Approach
The foregoing analysis suggests that we must seek radical expansion in
that such expansion, to be more than
the supply of justice under law -and
merely palliative, must meet at least two tests. First, the increase in supply
must be responsive to an increased demand for a share (both quantitative and
qualitative), a voice (in the shaping of justice-dispensing institutions) and for
a role as a supplier (as well as a consumer) of justice. Second, the increase
must operate to modify or eliminate the shortage-creating features which presently inhere in the product, the production system, and the manpower supply.
This section sets forth proposals which we believe, in varying ways, meet
these tests. We advance them, not because we reject the neighborhood law firm
but because we believe that there are fundamental problems with which the neighborhood law firm is not equipped to cope and because these new institutions
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can offer valuable auxiliary assistance in coping with those underlying deficiencies. But we repeat - the caveat stated in our original proposal for a neighborhood law firm -that none of these proposals purport to be panaceas; nor do
they purport to be exhaustive, or incorruptible. Every institution can be perverted into a vehicle which serves ends different, and even inimicable to those
it was designed to serve.'
No proposal is exempt including the following three for:
the creation of a neighborhood court system;
the development of crisis-oriented teams composed of professionals
and nonprofessionals; and
the absorption of both the neighborhood law firm and the neighborhood court into a nonprofit membership neighborhood corporation.
All these proposals have in common one characteristic. They each provide
a means for the consumer to participate in shaping the product and the production system. On the one hand, this will tend' to nullify the shortage-producing
on the other hand, will instill responsibility
characteristics of monopoly -and
to help limit the limitless demand found among those who have been systematically denied responsibility for making decisions about the allocation of limited
resources.
Each 'of these proposals contains subproposals; each generates serious
problems susceptible to numerous solutions; and each solution in turn proliferates
new problems and new solutions. It seems therefore imperative to preface these
proposals with an overview which offers a framework within which to view
each of these discreet proposals and through which problems might be approached.
each of these proposals, as in our earlier
What is really involved -in
proposal for a neighborhood law firm - is the redesigning of what might be
called "The Justice Industry" an industry which must offer a far more variegated line of products
in far greater quantity than heretofore
an industry which must cater to a far greater variety of markets with
a far greater consumption potential than previously appreciated.
New technologies do not spring forth fully developed. Inventions beget
inventions; demand begets demand. But if we approach each of the proposals
within the context of trying to redesign the Justice Industry, several important
points emerge.
First, the possibility that any given problem might be handled in more
than one way does not constitute a liability. Rather, it is a form of competition
among, for instance, means of settling a dispute. Thus, a dispute between husband and wife, or between two gangs, can be settled by adjudication that results
28

"Between the idea and the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Between the conception
And the creation ...

Falls the Shadow."
T. S. Eliot: "The Hollow Men," in COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 56, 59 (1952)
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in passing sentence on the offender, and prescribing certain norms of behavior
to be followed by the parties. But equally, such disputes might be resolved by
a form of arbitration or conciliation which resulted in the negotiation of a
treaty or compact between husband and wife, or between rival gangs - a compact which both laid out certain promises with regard to future conduct together
with a procedure for settling future disputes and for sanctioning action in violation of the compact. Finally, such a dispute might give rise to a referral to
various social agencies for counselling, for education and employment, and for
the influx of services aimed at eliminating the causes which gave rise to the
dispute in the first place. Each method of dispute settlement constitutes a
different product - of differing utility to different consumers - some clearly
more suitable than others for certain situations. The Justice Industry has an
obligation, not simply continuously to refine one product- but to develop new
and competing products to serve the varied needs of the consumer.
Second, the concept of neighborhood (which is central to each of these
proposals) is best approached as an attempt to delineate a market - a group
of potential consumers with a certain community of needs. In the urban slum,
this market has reasonably definable geographic configurations. For instance,
poor garbage collection, inadequate police protection, exorbitant credit charges,
poor schooling, patronizing and contemptuous treatment by officials, inferior
merchandise in local branches of department stores, stale produce with less
variety in local branches of supermarkets, unwillingness of taxicabs to stop in
certain neighborhoods, are all grievances which tend to be shared by all inhabitants of a geographic area - even where specific members of the community
happen to have higher incomes than others.29
Thus, because of the definable geographic locus of these needs neighborhood, viewed as a market concept for the Justice Industry makes sense -at
least in the urban context. But clearly the neighborhood as a market for the
Justice Industry is not necessarily coextensive with the neighborhood as market for the housing industry, the automotive industry, or other social service
industries. We are talking really about the configuration of injustice, as setting
the bounds of a neighborhood for present purposes.
Third, the concept of a neighborhood is not an attempt to obscure the
fact that some conflicts and grievances are primarily internal- and can be
handled quite well as intraneighborhood disputes, while other grievances are
external and require that the consumer be equipped with the means necessary
to do battle with interests and groups outside the neighborhood. The Justice
Industry should meet the consumer's needs with respect to both internal and
external disputes.
But the neighborhood definition of market does imply that many types of
conflict which appear to be conflicts between the neighborhood and the outside
world: e.g., the police, the school system, city hall, a taxicab company, a supermarket chain, etc., might well be converted into disputes most appropriately
29 This concept of neighborhood has much in common with the public-health concept of
"population at risk," during an epidemic which imperils all within a certain area, regardless of
race, color, creed, or income.
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handled within the neighborhood as internal disputes. Thus, when an out-ofstate corporation does business within a state, it is obliged to subject itself to
that state's laws. It is not permitted to use its status as a "foreign corporation"
as a source of refuge, escape and immunity for wrongs committed. Out-of-state
motorist statutes have the same effect. The neighborhood concept does therefore imply a preference for local accountability, local resolution of disputes and a commitment to provide the aggrieved with a source of remedy that does
not subject him unnecessarily to the perils of a foreign jurisdiction - whether
that foreign jurisdiction be "downtown" or the "commercial world" or the
"white world" or any world where institutions and rules of law hold sway which
are designed to deny him effective remedy and to protect the wrongdoer from
bearing responsibility for the consequences of his actions.
Fourth, the concept of neighborhood must, in practice be modified by
physical factors, ethnic factors, and above all, by subjective factors. A group's
perception of who is an insider and who an outsider, who shares their problems
and who does not, operates to fractionate the seeming homogeneity of need.
Fifth, the definition of neighborhood as a market for the Justice Industry
does not operate to define the size of the most efficient unit of production or
distribution. Thus, within a given "neighborhood" one might envision several
neighborhood law offices, and several neighborhood courts, simply because efficiency of production and distribution does not necessarily increase with size.
But the converse must be stated too: that the neighborhood must be large enough
to exercise the necessary effective bargaining power vis-4-vis the outside world.
It has, for instance, taken years before the special needs of the teen-age market
- or the special appeals necessary to minority group markets- were appreciated
by manufacturers. The neighborhood definition of market includes a concept
of threshold significance necessary to compel recognition and distinctive consideration.
Sixth, the term neighborhood is of dubious use (except as metaphor for
"community of interest") in delineating the market for the Justice Industry
outside the urban context, for migrant laborers, for Indians or for sharecroppers.
And in consequence, we return to the underlying purpose of the term: To
define a distinguishable market and insist that that be the operative principle
in utilizing and adapting any of the following proposals.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the market for the Justice Industry
is not the same as the market for the direct services of the legal profession. We
may, with the best of intentions, be guilty of equating the two and our own
proposals may reveal traces of that professional parochialism expressed by the
Learned Judge in Trial by Jury:
The Law is the true embodiment of everything that's excellent,
And I, of course, embody the law.
But the following proposals are offered as attempts to break out of that
deeply engrained mode of thinking - and to make a start at reshaping not
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merely the legal profession -but more importantly, the product, the production
system, and the manpower supply of the Justice Industry."°
A. The Neighborhood Court System
There is a clear need for the creation, on a neighborhood level, of mechanisms for settling disputes, dispensing remedies and enunciating norms of conduct.
Those needs cannot be dealt with by any single means. Some conflicts can
best be resolved by adjudication; others can be amicably settled by mutual
consent; still others are pseudo-conflicts based on false assumptions or lack of
knowledge above alternatives, resources and sources of assistance.
We believe that a neighborhood court system so constructed as to utilize
a variety of approaches to conflict resolution would make a substantial contribution to the rule of law, and would constitute a tangible and significant response to the demand for a share, a voice, and a role in the new dispensation
of justice. 1
We propose a neighborhood tribunal with at least four auxiliary ans: a
neighborhood arbitration commission, a panel of hearing referees with independent investigative resources, a youth division run and administered by youth,
a referral bureau (modelled after the English Citizens' Advice Bureau) and
possessing power to summon and initiate Grand Jury investigations. Each of
these institutions would be manned primarily by neighborhood inhabitantstrained and appropriately selected to fulfill their respective duties as officers of
the "court."
Such a neighborhood court system might well come into being as decentralized arbitration, fact finding and conciliation branches of the small claims court,
magistrates court, domestic relations court, juvenile court and landlord-tenant,
court. We are not proposing the replication in miniature of every specialized
municipal court-but rather we are suggesting the delegation of certain
arbitration, conciliation, fact finding, and hearing functions to locally based
and locally responsive tribunals. This decentralization alone would at least
relieve the poor person, faced with a complaint, of the awesome trip downtown
and would also contribute to ending the bewildering fragmentation of judicial
institutions which have emerged under the rubric of reform because of the
need for specialization and apparently simplified procedures.8 2
30 Other proposals, not dealt with in this piece, such as those for a neighborhood police
force manned and controlled by the inhabitants of a neighborhood, may go still further in this
direction.
31 In a speech on August 14, 1966, to the National Bar Association, Sargent Shriver,
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, stated:
We need to begin to devise ways in which disputes can be settled locally, within the community - through neighborhood reconciliation boards.
We need to involve the poor themselves in law enforcement, in code inspection, in policing the practices of merchants and landlords and welfare authorities.
Above all, we need to begin to build a sense of community, of full membership and full
citizenship in a society that does not pit "we" against "they," the powerful against the
poor, or white against black.
32 KAFKA, THF TRIAL 267-269 (Modem Library Edition 1937).
".... Before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the
country who begs for admittance to the law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit
the man at the moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will be allowed, then, to enter
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Any attempt to create local dispute-resolving institutions cannot and should
not proceed unmindful of the fundamental values embedded in procedural
safeguards -values
not lightly sacrificed in the name of speed, efficiency or
even harmony which can all too readily be converted into rationales for favoritism, irrationality, paternalism and majority tyranny. The history of the Juvenile
Court should serve notice that the creation of' informal approaches to the
handling of antisocial conduct and the resolution of conflict must be coupled
at the very least, with severe ceilings on the sanctions which can be imposed
in the name of social experimentation.
But the possibility of advancing the cause of justice through increasing
lay involvement in fact finding, adjudication and arbitration should not be
sacrificed a priori out of fear of abuse. The potential for abuse can be checked
by limiting the severity of the sanctions which can be imposed, and by providing
adequate appellate procedures.
Our proposal, however, envisions more than mechanical decentralization
of existing tribunals.
Accessibility, unification, comprehensibility are important- but they are
not ultimate values. By themselves, they hold no guarantee that the rule of
law will not be imposed from without - that new means of dispute resolution
will be evolved - or that the neighborhood will have a voice and a role in the
shaping and staffing of these new institutions.What then would be some of the basic additional ingredients of a neighborhood court system?
First, a simplified, lniform, intake procedure so that the persons aggrieved
-or
persons bewildered upon being receipt of some form 'of legal process would not bear the initial onus of diagnosis 'with respect to the precise jurisdictional nature of their problem before,being permitted to venture forth and secure
assistance.
Second, a variety of mechanisms formalized perhaps into procedural and
organizational subdivisions of the local court, would have to be provided including, but not limited to arbitration, conciliation, fact finding, public inquests, referral bureaus. The case for a multiplicity of techniques becomes more
compelling if one considers the following potpourri of grievances:
that truancy laws are being enforced in an arbitrary and punitive fashion;
that police are failing to provide adequate protection;
that license revocation combined with punitive fines is being meted out
unfairly by policemen;
that local hospitals are treating indigent patients in a discriminatory or
humiliating way;
later. 'It is possible; answers the doorkeeper, 'but not at this moment.'
"There he sits waiting for days and years....
"Now his life is drawing to a close. Before he dies, all that he has experienced during
the whole time of his sojourn condenses in his mind into one question, which he has never yet

put to the doorkeeper....
"'Everyone strives to attain the Law,'

. .

'how does it come about, then, that in all

these years no one has come seeking admittance but me?' The doorkeeper perceives that the

man is nearing his end and his hearing is failing, so he bellows in his ear: 'No one but you could
gain admittance through this door, since this door was intended for you. I am now going to
shut it.'"
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that landlords are refusing to abide by pledges to make prompt repairs;
that assignment to track systems in the local school is being done without
adequate safeguard, tests, or possibility for later reassignment;
that the local school is failing to offer academic courses or essential vocational courses;
that principals are not submitting budget requests for necessary hot lunches,
recreation equipment or educational materials;
that the sanitation department is derelict in its trash collection or discriminatorily picayune in its insistence on the separation of trash and food garbage;
that arrests and prosecution for numbers or prostitution is erratic or
punitive;
that potential disorder in taverns or at teen-age dances is being dealt with
particularly oppressively with inadequate advance consultation;
that welfare clients are kept in the dark with respect to the items included
in their welfare allowance or with respect to reduction or termination of their
allowance.
Some of these call for individual fact finding proceedings; others for grand
jury investigations; others for arbitration and conciliation; others for self-policing
mechanisms; others for private hearings; others for public meetings and confrontations; others for formal complaints against public officials and agencies;
others for referral to social agencies.
Many of these grievances do not give rise to any formal right; some result
in injuries too slight to activate the present cumbersome system of redress and
remedy; others are currently handled by persons who lack knowledge and
empathy for peculiar conditions, cultural patterns and life styles which tend to
be either disregarded or disdained; others involve neighborhood rather than
individual complaints where the gravamen of the complaint is most closely akin
to a theory of public nuisance.
The multiplicity of problems mandates the proliferation of procedural re-,
sponses. But the product of the legal system itself must be altered from an
emphasis on rule making and refinement of precedent to situational justice which
contributes directly to the well-being of the parties involved.3"
In effect, the product of the legal system would undergo a shift from the
proliferation of rules to the creation of forums where modes of conduct can be
examined, scrutinized and approved or disapproved by organisms that reflect
community values. Currently, it is fashionable to attempt to inculcate knowl33 Professor Mentschikoff has indicated that arbitration has special attractiveness to commercial interests where any of a number of factors are of prime importance: speed of adjudication can be increased, normal legal procedures pose great uncertainty and unpredictability;
specialized expertise related to prevailing custom is particularly essential, the goods involved are
fungible rather than unique. Her findings appear to have direct applicability to the neighborhood context.
Professor Mentschikoff also notes a correlation between the presence of institutionalized
arbitration and the presence of other mechanisms of control such as self-regulatory committees
on ethics and disciplinary proceedings, rules, and form contracts. As will appear later, we consider that the neighborhood court system would be strengthened, if it were an integral part of a
nonprofit membership neighborhood corporation that had correlative local self-regulatory and
decision-making functions.
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COL. L. REV. 846 (1961).
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edge about rights by educational drives to disseminate information about specific
rules.
Such attempts at lay education in the law underestimate the general populace's understanding of the principles of reasonableness, notice, and negligence.
They equally underestimate the widespread appreciation of the absence of
forums to make such rules - or their underlying principles - either enforceable or relevant. The same effort might be much better placed in creating
institutions that in effect say to the people that certain kinds of behavior will
be met with certain kinds of community scrutiny. The creation of forums where
behavior is scrutinized locally, where parties will be called upon to arrive at
new terms, reach new understandings and enter into new commitments is likely
to be a far more effective mode of social control than the learning of legal rules
by rote. 4
The practicability of a neighborhood court system will depend in part on
its ability to secure jurisdiction over both parties and subject matter. But amongst
the possible sources of jurisdiction are the following:
a. decentralization of the prosecutor's office might yield arrangements for
advisory lay opinions on commitment, and pressing of charges;
b. decentralization of the welfare department, employment service, medical clinics and other social agencies might produce a contract to negotiate agencyclient differences modelled after the arbitrational services presently available by
contract with the American Arbitration Association;
c. the absence of any other forum for the presentation of grievances would
cast the neighborhood court into a general Ombudzman role with investigatory,
fact finding and recommendatory responsibilities;
d. a doctrine of abstention (or alternatively, exhaustion of administrative
remedies) might lead courts to decline to handle a case until it had gone
through the neighborhood court system on grounds that that was the most
suitable forum, that its findings would be upheld as a general principle, and
34 The inadequacy of present mechanisms of social control (whether they be governmental
institutions, or private institutions delegated these functions by law and common consent) is
masked by an implicit and often explicit understanding on the areas of enforcement and nonenforcement, on an unauthorized departure from publicly enunciated norms. The appearance
of law abidingness rests on acceptance of the lawless imposition of order by private power. Yet,
even this illicit mode of maintaining order no longer seems to suffice in part due to the deterioration of many of our prime mechanisms of social control: discrimination, the ward system,
the draft, police brutality.
Most centrally, the family has lost its capacity to instill norms of behavior, to offer incentives for certain kinds of creative and useful activity, to provide significant refuge for the individual, to offer a forum for the resolution of private disputes, to provide education, or secure
jobs. Erosion
of the work ethic has weakened another major instrument
of social control. In a
society that relies on a high level of consumption, the credit system has effectively undermined
the nexus between conduct and reward. It grants immediate enjoyment in return for a Hen
on the future. But such a lien is hardly an effective mode of social control for people who,
amidst today's crisis, can contemplate no future--except possibly that of an afterlife (presumably free of creditors).
This is not intended as a lament for the family, religion, the nobility of labor, the glories
of the immigrant ghetto, the true democracy of the ward heeler, the vertical mobility once
available through manual labor and organized (but ethnocentric) crime.
But there is, we believe, a need to create a successor to these and other institutions which
for varying reasons have ceased to perform the functions of social control, conflict resolution,
mutual accommodation, rule making and dispensing of remedies.
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that in any event, it would be the best forum where all relevant factors, equities
and considerations could be made part of the formal record;
e. decentralization or delegation of jurisdictional grants of existing courts;
f. neighborhood pressures on merchants, landlords, politically vulnerable
officials and agencies to utilize the local court system- all of which might be
intensified by the creation of a neighborhood corporation;"5
g. availability of unique remedies and forums for novel causes of action
would offer incentives not dissimilar from those which won gradual ascendancy
for the King's Courts over the feudal and ecclesiastical courts, and which, in
turn, resulted in the subsequent carving out of certain special jurisdictional areas
by the Court of Chancery"; and
h. finally, it is not too much to hope that the democratization of justice
would be, in itself, incentive for the generation of jurisdiction-in broadening
the commitment of all to the role of law, in increasing voluntary law abidingness, in savings of time and acrimony through the expeditious handling of local
disputes -and
in generating a sense of community where the presence; of
conflict did not obscure the transcendent values of democracy.
Finally, explicit mention should be made of the manpower problems which
this proposal entails. We would urge strongly the creation of a class of lay
advocates - trained and appropriately chosen - to be drawn from the ranks
of the community to serve informally as counsel." Equally, we would think it
appropriate, in certain cases, to have both arbitration boards and panels of
judges composed of laymen as well as lawyers - and that the neighborhood
court would become a source not merely of employment, but of apprenticeship
in the calling of Justice.
Different classes of cases would involve a degree of privacy and confidentiality
not compatible with general community knowledge. On the other hand, emotion-charged and controversial cases will endanger individuals who bear the
35 Consider the effect of a strong trade association on the use of arbitration. Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COL. L. REV. 846 (1961).
36 The ascendency of the curia regis was due to the fact that for several centuries it offered
a better and fairer procedure because more flexible courses of action and new remedies were
open to that court which were not open to the common law courts. For example: in the 14th
century there developed in the King's court an authority for the court sitting coram rega ipso
to hear and determine pleas which affected the Crown. However, a Writ of Trespass contained
allegations to the effect that the wrong committed was one of force of arms against the King's
peace. It was not long before civil jurisdiction grew to encompass not just trespass but trespass
on the case.
POTTER: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW,

119-128 (1948).

Later, the King's Council reached out to provide remedies which were otherwise not judicially cognizable in other courts. The jurisdiction of that court was based on the theory that a
residue of justice was left in the King and hence his Council. The system was confined neither
by the limits of the writ system nor by specific rules of procedure and process. The system was
followed for centuries by the Council which heard many causes simply on the grounds "that
there did not exist an efficacious or practical remedy in any other court." Id. at 140. From the
Council as well as the King's court one can trace the development of the court of Chancery
and the further attempt of Anglo-Saxon law to meet the need for more flexible causes of
action and new remedies. We are simply proposing that the historical dialectic which later
produced a merger of law and equity should continue apace.
37 In Tompkins County, New York, a youth court has been in operation for some time.
Jurisdiction is by waiver of the juvenile court approved by county referendum. A youth bar
composed of youngsters, who have been through a ten-week training session, "bar exam" and
interview provide counsel. Youth judges are selected from among members of the youth bar.
Sentences range up to 50 hours of constructive work - manual or academic. Cases have involved shoplifting, malicious mischief, drunkenness, driving without a license.
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brunt of decision-making as federal district court judges in the South know all
too well. Nonetheless, the utter detachment of the judicial function from contact with the consumer perspective is not as George Bernard Shaw pointed out,
the best guarantee of Justice:
Judges spend their lives in consigning their fellow creatures to prison;
and when some whisper reaches them that prisons are horribly cruel and
destructive places, and that no creature fit to live should be sent there,
they only remark calmly that prisons are not meant to be comfortable;
which is no doubt the consideration that reconciled Pontius Pilate to the
practice of crucifixionRs
We would hope, therefore, that the neighborhood court system would,
at all costs, not become a new form of judicial patronage - but instead would
be grasped as an opportunity for reconstituting and democratizing the manpower force of the Justice Industry.
The wisdom of utilizing such Tribunals simply to establish new outposts
for professional imperialism is dubious. The natives are restless.
B. Expanding the Manpower Supply through Creation of Crisis-oriented Teams
Expansion of the manpower supply will require both quantitative and qualitative changes in the nature of the manpower involved and the measures of
productivity. The expansion of the manpower supply must not be perceived
as a form of empire building by the legal profession. Rather, it must be viewed
as a part of the retooling of the Justice Industry (even if that larger growth be
at the expense of the legal profession's present monopoly). Productivity must
be measured not simply on a case-by-case basis but, from the point of the
individual client, viewed as a total human being, and also from the viewpoint
of the entire community viewed as a single corporate body (as well as the aggregate of individual clients). Within the profession and legal institutions as they
now exist must emerge a set of roles and mechanisms designed specifically to
represent the consumer or client against the narrow jurisdictional and disciplinary outlook of the profession.
The fact that a lawyer can solve a problem brought by a client does not
ipso facto make that the most important problem of the client or even the most
relevant method of solution. The legal problems of the poor as they reach
the lawyer's office can be most profitably viewed as a class of crisis - for the
individual and possibly for the entire community - a crisis susceptible of many
forms of response, not all of them involving the unique skills of the legal
profession."
1. The problems of the poverty sector require that the provision of assist38 SHAw, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 14 (1946),
ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1922).

London for bringing this passage to our attention.
39

published as a preface to WEBB,
We are indebted to Mr. Ephraim

The legal profession has no monopoly on crisis:
"The Physicians are the natural attorneys of the poor, and social problems fall to a large
extent within their jurisdiction."
(RUDOLF ViRcHOW, Drs MEDIZINISCHE REFORM, 1848, quoted by H. E. SIGERIST in MEDICINE
& HUMAN WELFARE, THE TERRY LECTURES 93 ( 1941).
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ance, both to an individual and to a community must be treated as a form of
crisis intervention calling for the minimal, total, diversified effort needed to insure maximum and lasting impact.4"
2. The technical jobs now performed by lawyers can to a considerable
extent be adequately performed by less extensively trained persons. (The legal
secretary is the paradigm of the nonprofessional as technician.)
3. The advocacy role now performed by lawyers can to a considerable
extent be adequately performed by laymen. 1
4. Alternatives to the profession's current methods - both as advocates
and as technicians - must be systematically explored and tested. (Protest,
community organization, information bureaus, arbitration, individual counselling,
therapy, debt consolidation, all offer at times viable and even superior substitutes for legal craftsmanship and legal advocacy.)
5. Requests for legal assistance should not be treated as self-defining or
self-validating nor should the individual quality of the request be deemed conclusive with regard to the nature of the underlying cause.
6. The solo practitioner, one-to-one relationship should be supplemented,
and (where appropriate) supplanted by team approaches.
7. The isolated anecdotal approach to characterization should be accompanied by the development of modes of classification which treat individual
instances as possible symptoms of a social pathology. That pathology can be
diagnosed and in many cases cured, if treatment is not obscured by professionalism geared to respond to only one aspect of the total pathology.
8. Mechanisms and roles for advancing the consumer's perspective over
and against that of a profession, discipline or institution must be developed and
institutionalized within the Justice Industry.
Implementation of these steps will call for creation of a new methodology
of diagnosis and training, the development of new sets of skills for the manpower supply of the Justice Industry, the creation of new relationships among
40 And crises, at least in the lives of individuals, have three characteristics. Their outcome
is not determined by antecedent factors.
"These factors load the dice in favor of a good or bad . . . outcome. But what actually
occurs depends on the interplay of endogenous and exogenous forces in the course of the crisis.
External intervention during the disequilibrium of crisis may counteract the loading of the dice
and lead to an unexpected result - good or bad."
"During the crisis, an individual experiences a heightened desire for help, and the signs of
his distress evoke a helping response from those around...
"During the disequilibrium of the crisis, a person is more susceptible to influence by others
than during periods of stable functioning. When the forces are, as it were, teetering in the balance, a relatively minor intervention may weigh them down to one side or the other. The
resulting steady state will then be relatively stable.
"Crisis therefore presents care-giving persons with a remarkable opportunity to deploy their
efforts to maximum advantage in influencing the.., health of others."
CAPLAN, PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE PSYCHIATRY 53-54 (1964).
We would posit that the same crisis intervention principles apply to groups and neighborhoods as to individuals.
41 As Attorney General Katzenbach pointed out:
"Not every injury requires a surgeon; not every injustice requires an attorney.
"We need what is, in effect, a new profession-a profession of advocates for the poor made
up of human beings from all professions, committed to helping others who are in trouble.
"That job is too big-and I would add, too important-to be left only to lawyers.
"Until we can achieve that kind of broad involvement, that willingness to stand up for the
poor and to help the poor stand up for themselves, old wrongs will go unredressed and new
wrongs will occur."
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members of that manpower supply, the creation of a Research and Development division within the Justice Industry - and finally the evolution of
mechanisms of control, disclosure and accountability of the Industry to the
consumer.
Social workers, lawyers, educators and psychiatrists are too scarce to do
the mass of screening and referrals made necessary by the pathology of the
poverty stricken ghetto community. The ghetto requires treatment on a massive
basis. This being so, it is now necessary to develop teams of persons who have
the requisite range and quality of skills.
There will need to be considerable experimentation in determining the
composition and orientation of teams composed of different mixes of professionals
and nonprofessionals and in defining the relationship between professional and
nonprofessional (e.g., supervisor, teacher, resource person or consultant).42
The function, composition and internal dynamics of the team will vary
directly in accordance with its base. In other words, significant variation will
occur where the base is the neighborhood law firm, the neighborhood court, the
juvenile court, or the precinct station. In order to build in immunization against
professionalism, each member of the team will need to develop an overview
of the team's entire operation and be given optimal opportunity to develop leadership, administrative, and analytic experience through utilization of quasiclinical training methods.
Specifically, the beliefs enumerated above would require the development
of a reservoir of individuals with special skills: crisis recognition, awareness and
delineation of the total problems of the individual presenting a crisis, referral
knowledge necessary to ascertain the relevant sources of assistance and advocacy
skills (including a sophisticated appreciation of levels of bureaucratic and professional decision-making) necessary to secure the needed assistance in time to
function on behalf of the individual. Such people might be trained to utilize a
method such as an interviewing form with a built-in checklist cross-referenced
to a compendium of available sources of assistance (including lists of actionoriented community groups) regardless of present jurisdictional classifications.
The purpose is to create producer roles whose central function is to advance the cause of the client or the consumer against and despite professional,
disciplinary, or institutional lines of jurisdiction. Yet, realistically, such roles will
only be filled conscientiously by persons who possess marketable skills sufficient
that they need not fear loss of economic security in doing battle for the client
against even- their own employer. Realistically this requires that besides the
special skills mentioned above, the job categories will have to overlap with job
descriptions for which there is at present a general market such as investigators,
legal secretaries, interviewers, messengers and referral and intake personnel.
C. Incorporating the Justice Industry
The Justice Industry labors under a special fiduciary obligation to protect
the interest of, and to retain the perspective of the consumer. But a public
trust is not self-executing, even in the case of public utilities or common carriers.
42 CAPLAN, PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTrIvE PSYCHIATRY Ch. 8 and 9 (1964) for an analysis of
the different approaches to the consultative role.
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Historically, consumers of both goods and services have not been able to muster
the sustained effort necessary to look out for their own interest. Policing by a
public body is one way this has been attempted. But this method is just a
particular instance of a more general principle: that the consumer interest is
protected only to the extent that people are paid to do so. In short, producer
roles must be created to protect the consumer interest (regardless of whether
those roles are denominated as lobbyists, fighters, professional organizations, advocates, attorneys, or public officials).
The above proposals have attempted to achieve protection of the consumer's
interest by emphasizing the creation of producer roles for consumers. But' noting
the tendency toward infiltration and domination of regulatory bodies by those
interests they were created to regulate, we propose to couple these producer
roles with provision for vesting ownership of the Justice Industry in the consumer. Eligibility for membership, goods and services would thus be based on
the market concept of neighborhood.4"
We would begin then, by proposing that the central production units of
justice for the poor -the
neighborhood law firm and neighborhood courts become operating subdivisions of a nonprofit membership corporation. 4
The act of incorporation is not in itself a solution. Legal forms only provide
frameworks within which solutions can be devised through agreed upon procedures. But the conversion of the neighborhood law firm (and the neighborhood court) into branches of a nonprofit corporation would offer specific
advantages.
It would provide a mechanism for consumer decision with regard to the
production priorities of the corporation as a consequence flowing from technical
ownership of the corporation and its various enterprises. Thus, for instance, the
choice with regard to the use of attorneys to seek out test cases, the provision of
a mechanism to review decisions refusing to take a particular case or client, the
decision to enter into a liaison with a university to conduct legal research or to
employ law students, volunteers, or nonprofessionals, the priority assigned to
the performance of a pure service function, the decision to provide extensive
counsel to neighborhood courts or to assist in designing and spinning off subsidiary corporate enterprises would be matters for membership approval or disapproval - though, management would have the obligation (though not the
sole right) to present the case, make the recommendations, initiate new proposals, and present plans for expansion and diversification.
Without subscribing, as an article of faith, to the automatic efficacy of
corporate democracy, we do wish to point out that the factors that account for
a divorce between ownership and control, shareholding and management appear
not to be present here (and do not seem to be an inextricable aspect of the

43 This is not incompatible with representation on the board of directors of affected interests
or even the creation of distinct classes of shareholders or investors who would, at least, have
a say with respect to specifically denominated issues - including possibly liquidation, sale of
assets, merger, etc.
44 But since neither justice nor law are limited to the narrow machinery which society labels
the machinery of justice, we would not anticipate that these would be the only two divisions, or
even, necessarily the major divisions of the neighborhood corporation.
-
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earliest corporations such as the university, the ecclesiastical parish, the municipal corporation, the guild and the borough corporation)."'
There is reason to believe that corporate democracy can be made to
function where ownership is relatively constant, where ownership rests in the
consumer, where ownership contains a significant proportion of producers in
the Justice Industry - and where all owners have an abiding interest in the
caliber of the product, the availability of the product, the vitality and innovativeness of the total enterprise. All would have a direct, personal and daily stake
in the corporation's capacity to reduce internal community conflict, to serve as
a bulwark against external threats to privacy, dignity and self-determination
while simultaneously serving as champion, Ombudzman, and lobbyist in arenas
where before the poor have been outmanned, outmaneuvered and "outclassed."
Beyond the question of control to ensure responsiveness, technical ownership
and membership in the corporation offer a variety of possibilities for creative
organization of decision-making processes and for devising innovative means of
securing, maintaining or increasing ownership involvement and community
4
commitment. 6
The formulation of or ratification of new enterprises, the creation of ownership-manned complaint or information bureaus attached to each neighborhood
law firm or neighborhood court, the procedures for merger or partnership with
other neighborhood groups for limited joint ventures, can make consumer ownership a significant vehicle of consumer protection - particularly where the ownership itself becomes an instrument of education, involvement, community organization and increased neighborhood cohesiveness.
Furthermore, new ventures (such as credit unions, insurance plans,
planning commissions, cooperatives, youth courts, home maintenance corporations) will emerge from a base of documented need and community support which will greatly enhance their likelihood of success - particularly if
locally owned and operated with widespread community accountability. Without
implying any ultra vires limitation on corporate activity, there would seem to be
particular virtue in beginning first with those new enterprises that had as the
initiating force the detection of a series of injustices, grievances and legal crises
which could best be obviated by new forms of preventive institutional services,
resources and opportunities.
In effect, we propose the democratization of justice - the conversion of
a guild production system into a democratically owned enterprise which offers
special incentives to professionals to be responsive to consumer needs rather
than to build a hierarchy of prestige, salary, and power based on successive
stages of withdrawal from reality, need and the consumer perspective.
Ultimately, the Neighborhood Corporation is a new form of polity 45 Manning, Book Review of LVNGSTON, TE AMERicAN STOCKHOLDER, 67 YALXE L. J.
1477 (1958) for a most cogent and succinct summarization of the anticorporate democracy
position.
46 This might be done by pledges of services, by participation in a neighborhood police or

code inspection force, by serving on neighborhood arbitration boards, or by the assumption of

other forms of leadership responsibility.
Polling of the ownership can be a particularly effective and compelling form of market
research with respect to unmet needs and new areas for concentration and activity. In addition,
ownership can operate to confer status and enhance ability to cope with the outside community.
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providing a means of resolving disputes, of reenfranchising individuals with
respect to the internal management of community affairs while simultaneously
expanding the supply of services and strengthening the advocacy posture of the
neighborhood vis-k.-vis the rest of society.
The corporate form is not an attempt to idealize the neighborhood or to
romanticize the past. It begins with a recognition that there are, among the
most deprived, geographic areas which correspond to common needs and common indignities. And that, given shape and form, that communality of interest
can take the form of a pact with the present that neither seals off the future nor
surrenders control to others over the right to participate in man's unending
quest for justice.

